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Political Connections and Corporate Financial Decision Making
Abstract
This paper investigates whether political connections influence managerial financial decisions.
Our study reveals that those firms that have a politician on its board of directors are highly
leveraged, hold large excess cash and are associated with low quality financial reporting
compared to their non-connected counterparts. These effects escalate with the strength of the
connected politician and whether he or his party is in power. The winning party effect is
observed to be stronger than victory by the politician himself. Overall, our paper provides
strong evidence that political connection is a two-edged sword. It is indeed a valuable resource
for connected firms, but it comes at a cost of poor investor protection.
Keywords: Political connection; Earnings management; Financial policies.
21. Introduction
The effect of political connections on business is well recognized, but not well understood. It
is generally argued that firms secure economic benefits and advantages from connections with
politicians (Xu et al., 2018; Batta et al 2014; Faccio, 2010), particularly in less developed
markets (Pan and Tian, 2018; Batta et al 2014; Chen et al., 2011; Claessens et al., 2008). For
instance, Muttakin et al. (2015) show that politically connected family firms outperform non-
connected family firms in Bangladesh. Claessens et al. (2008) reveal that bank finance is an
important channel through which political connections operate in Brazil. On the other hand,
some studies have provided evidence that political connection weakens the corporate board
governance (Fan et al., 2008) and reduces managerial incentives to maximize shareholder
wealth (Bertrand et al., 2018; Ding et al., 2015). A more recent study among Venezuelan
industrial firms facing expropriation risk by Batta et al (2014) shows that politically connected
firms have higher accounting quality than non-connected firms.
The foregoing studies suggest that political connection, if anything, has a “two-edged
sword” effect on the firm. As such, we posit that in order to fully appreciate the effect of
political connection, we need to look at a broad set of firm policies. In this study, we examine
the impact of political connections, in Pakistan, on a broad set of financial policies, including
firm leverage, long-term debt, excess cash holdings and accruals management. We focus on
these policies because, as key elements of financial strategy and corporate risk taking, they
represent a set of factors most likely to be affected by political connections.
There are several reasons why Pakistan is particularly interesting for the study we
propose. First, the vast majority of the population, around 95%, is Muslim. The basic tenet of
Islam requires business practices to be conducted in an honest and fair manner as Muslims
believe in the eternal concept of life, in which honesty is rewardable and dishonesty punishable.
Following the view that religious beliefs influence the personality traits, e.g., honesty and work
ethics, which may affect economic outcomes (Saeed et al., 2015), it is expected that managers
would refrain from involving in such transactions that violate the core Islamic values. Second,
despite the religious element, Pakistani politicians and firms are well known for their cozy
relations (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Over the last fifteen years, three prime-ministers and their
governments were dismissed due to political patronage and misuse of power, which shows the
pervasiveness of corruption within the country. Third, because of the weak democratic
institutions, an underdeveloped financial sector and the state-ownership of banks, political
connections are likely to be particularly valuable, especially through government dictated
3preferential access to government bank credit. Moreover, Pakistan imposes no legal restrictions
on political influence on the private sector (Rehman, 2006). This partly explains the high
proportion of politically connected firms in Pakistan. Lastly, like many other developing
economies, Pakistan has adopted a Western-style corporate governance model which requires
greater board independence and separation of the CEO and chairperson. However, the
effectiveness of these governance measures could be compromised due to the weak
institutional environment (Javid, 2010). These characteristics of the Pakistani economy furnish
a fertile field to ascertain the effect of the two-edged sword political connection.
Given that the impact of connections largely depends on the level of the institutional
and economic development of the country (Lee & Wang, 2017; Muttakin et al., 2015; Faccio,
2006), we contend that, in the context of Pakistan, the benefit of political connection comes
from easy access to bank financing. Easy access to finance is usually greater when the firm
operates in a country with a high level of corruption among its officials, low protection of
property rights, a high interventionist government, or a nondemocratic government (Pan and
Tian, 2018; Faccio 2006). Moreover, in Pakistan the majority of corporate external financing
is through the banking sector (Ahsan et al., 2016). As argued by Chava and Puranandum
(2010), short-term debt is considered a riskier financing decision (compared to long-term debt)
because it exposes firms to refinancing and interest rate risks. Hence, we also investigate the
use of long-term debt and short-term debt to gain a better understanding of the effect of political
ties on firm leverage.
We also study two other aspects of corporate decision making, namely the excess cash
holdings and the earnings management decisions. Politically connected firms in Pakistan are
less likely to be financially constrained because of the easy access to finance that they enjoy
through their political ties. More specifically, connected firms are able to evade the high
transaction costs and financial market uncertainties because of privileged treatment in the credit
market. Effectively, these firms do not have an incentive to hoard liquid assets at similar levels
to those firms lacking such relationships (Hill et al., 2014). Consequently, the demand for cash
reserves becomes further weakened. In this regard, we posit that firms holding a large amount
of excess cash, in the absence of transaction or uncertainty motives can be interpreted as an
indication of an agency problem as excess cash increases the propensity of managers to
squander excess cash. To delve further into the deleterious effect of political connections, we
argue that to camouflage the impact of resources used for political objectives, politically
connected firms are more likely to manipulate their accounting information. Consequently, low
quality reporting is expected from the politically connected. Collectively, our contention is
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corporate governance due to political interventions (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2018; Khan et al.,
2016; Muttakin et al., 2015; Boubakri et al., 2013). Thus, poor corporate governance coupled
with the easy access to credit increases the propensity of managers to adopt policies that can
help them in pursuing political objectives at the expense of the shareholders, which includes
holding excessively large cash balances and low reporting quality.
To examine these contentions, we use a sample of 403 Pakistani listed non-financial
firms over the period 2002-2010. Panel regressions are estimated independently for each
aforementioned financing policy. We define politically connected firms as those that have a
politician on their board of directors and find that political connections exert a positive and
significant impact on firm leverage. We also find that connected firms have more leverage than
non-connected firms, which is evidence supporting the existence of politically motivated credit
allocation. Interestingly, we find that the effect of political connections varies with respect to
the success of the individual politician as well as with respect to the success of his affiliated
party. For example, a winning politician has more impact than a losing politician while a
winning politician from a winning party has the greatest impact. Our additional results reveal
that connected firms have a higher percentage of long-term debt than their non-connected
counterparts. On the other hand, connections do not have any impact on short-term debt.
Keeping in view the prevalence of short-term debt in a developing economy such as Pakistan,
where banks use short-term leverage as a monitoring tool, our results are strong evidence
supporting the relationship between political connectedness and financial advantage. The
drawback to short-term debt is that it is a riskier financing vehicle than long term debt because
it exposes firms to refinancing as well as interest rate risks. Longer loan deals also make it
possible to reduce the risk of renegotiating when their politician and/or his party is out of
power. Given the fragile political environment within the country (in the last two decades three
elected governments in Pakistan were dissolved before even completing their half-terms), this is an
important consideration.
We next investigate how political connections influence excess corporate cash
holdings. High excess cash signals the presence of agency problems (e.g. Belghitar and Clark,
2014; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Opler et al., 1999; Dittmar et al., 2003). We document that
politically connected firms hold larger amounts of excess cash than their non-connected peers.
Our result contradicts the conventional wisdom that easy access to credit lowers the likelihood
among connected firms to suffer liquidity constraints so it is unlikely for them to hold large
cash. Nevertheless, our result is in line with the agency theory. Drawing on agency theory,
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al., 2015; Faccio, 2010) document that connected firms face severe agency problems, as they
have weak firm-level governance and boards in connected firms cannot play their monitoring
role due to the political interventions. So, poor corporate governance coupled with the easy
access to external finance may lead managers of connected firms to adopt policies that may
help them in pursuing their personal objectives at the cost of shareholders, which includes
holding large cash balances available to be squandered by consuming perquisites such as the
pursuit of political objectives. This effect increases with the power of the politician depending
on whether he and/or his party are winners.
We also assess the quality of financial reporting by looking at the relationship between
political connections and accruals management. Reporting corporate earnings in a ‘true and
fair’ manner that permits outsiders to monitor their claims and exercise their rights is a crucial
requirement for effective corporate governance (e.g., Ben-Nasr et al. 2015). Our empirical
findings for accruals management show that the presence of political connections reflects a
lower quality of financial reporting. Further, we report that the extent of accruals manipulation
escalates with the strength of the connected politician. The interpretation of our results is that
politically connected firms derive gains from their connections in the form of higher leverage
and more utilization of long-term debt, and concurrently hold large amounts of free
cashpotentially with the intention of misusing it. In this way, firms attempt to hide the
political benefits and political expenditure with the purpose of intentionally misleading
shareholders to gain benefits at their expense.
Taken together, we can draw three broad conclusions from our results. First, our
findings indicate that connected firms utilize more leverage (more long-term debt), hold larger
excess cash balances and have lower quality financial reporting. These results are robust to a
battery of tests including the use of alternative measures for financial policies, an alternative
and broader definition of political connections, the use of instrumental variables, as well as to
additional control variables of corporate governance. We interpret our results for large excess
cash balances and low quality financial reporting as an indication of poor governance which is
associated with the agency problems. Secondly, we find that having connections with a winning
politician or a politician affiliated with the ruling party has a strong impact on the firms’
financing policies, thereby implying that the costs and benefits associated with political
connections ultimately rest on electoral outcomes. One aspect worth mentioning is that the
winning party effect is more pronounced than the winning politician effect. This finding can
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governmental and quasi-governmental financial resources, affiliated politicians have more
influence in determining how these resources are allocated. Lastly, the appointment of a
politician to a board is an important source of financial resources for a firm, although it entails
a corresponding cost in the form of potential agency problems. Thus, results presented herein
should not be interpreted as a recommendation for corporate political activity, as we
collectively report the benefits and costs faced by firms that establish political connections.
The study, however, is silent on the cost-benefit calculus which determines the decision of
whether or not to establish political connections.
These results contribute to the large corporate finance and accounting literature by
highlighting a previously under-appreciated determinant of corporate financial decisions (e.g.
Frank and Goyal, 2009; Walsh and Ryan, 1997). Previous studies have focused primarily on
corporate finance theories (e.g., trade off and pecking-order theories) that have very little to
say about the role of political connectedness. We find, however, that political influence plays
a significant role in the financial policies of Pakistani firms and, thus, the political aspect needs
to be included in theoretical models that examine corporate financial policies. In addition, this
study contributes to the extant literature on the relation between political connections and
corporate outcomes. Most of the earlier studies look at corporate policies independently and
use highly dissimilar types of connections, making it difficult to grasp the overall impact of
political ties on corporate policies.1 This study provides a more comprehensive picture of the
political connections-corporate policies nexus by incorporating four essential financial policies
in a single study and documents that the impact of political connectedness on financial policies
varies with the political strength of the politician.
The layout of this article is as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional environment
in Pakistan. Section 3 provides some theoretical background and develops the hypotheses.
Section 4 describes the data and summary statistics; Section 5 presents univariate comparison.
The main empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 6 and, finally, Section 7
concludes the paper.
1 The only notable exceptions are Faccio (2010) and Boubakri et al. (2012). Faccio examines the impact of political
connections that firms can have on leverage, taxation, market share, productivity and performance, whereas
Boubakri et al. report the effects of political connectedness on a firm’s leverage and operating performance.
72. Institutional environment in Pakistan
Pakistan’s financial system has been highly skewed towards the banking sector that accounts
for 95 percent of the financial sector with an asset size of 42.6 percent of GDP (Hameed et al.,
2013). Banks mainly serve the needs of the government, public sector organizations, and a few
very large family firms, while small and medium-sized firms and the agricultural sector are
predominantly absent from the equation. The most important reason for this lending pattern is
the political interference in both lending decisions and banks’ top management (board
appointments) (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Consequently, private sector lending is given based
on political considerations rather than on merit which makes the recovery rate so low that the
percentage of non-performing loans has ranged between 16.2 and 23.4% during the period
2000-2011 (International Monitory Fund, 2016), a rate that is much higher than other
developing countries in the region, such as India (4.9%). Additionally, the tax rate for the
banking industry is 58% compared to 35% for the corporate sector (Husain, 2012). The cost of
the high punitive tax rate along with the burden of non-performing loans is passed on to the
customers in the interest rate, which has been about 21% per annum over last decade (Husain,
2012).
One of the important reasons for the immaturity of the financial sector is the political
interference. Political influence in the banking sector leads to limited autonomy of the central
bank of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), since all financial and administrative decisions
made by the SBP are subject to approval of the Ministry of Finance that arguably serves the
interests of the government (Khan, 2018). The appointment of the head of SBP is also made
by the sitting government, which it generally does on the basis of political ties (Kundi, 2017).
Consequently, the entire financial system has suffered from considerable political interference
in lending and collection activities. It is important to mention that despite the partial
privatization of some leading banks in Pakistan (e.g. ABL, HBL and MCB), the government
continues to influence their decisions as 49% of their shares are still owned by the government
(State Bank of Pakistan, 2017). In August 2015, the government passed the ‘State Bank of
Pakistan (Amendment) Bill 2015’ that empowers the SBP to take financial decisions
independently. However sceptics have raised concern about the efficiency of this initiative
because the autonomy is linked with political will and the continuation of old policies (Khan,
2018).
Another important aspect of the Pakistani financial market is the limited role of the stock
market in raising capital. The Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is the main exchange in Pakistan.
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raises little capital. The number of new listings during the period 2002-2012 was 4 per year
with the exception of 2010 when 6 new companies were listed. Moreover, KSE is regarded as
a highly manipulated market. For example, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that brokers use a
trade-based ‘pump and dump’ price manipulation strategy to benefit themselves. The result of
all this is a marginal equity market with weak investor confidence that attracts few outsiders
and raises relatively small amounts of capital. Regarding insolvency laws, Pakistan does not
have a bankruptcy law (Jamal, 2015). Bankruptcy is generally handled through court-appointed
liquidators who sell off the property of a bankrupt company, but this process is slow and can
take years (International Business Promotion, 2015).
Despite the structural reforms initiated in the early 2000s to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the country, the level of FDI has declined sharply over the last five years
(Zaheer, 2016). Researchers attribute this decline to the deteriorating security environment,
poor governance, the chronic energy crisis, a lack of privatization since 2008, and
macroeconomic instability (Shah et al., 2016; Anwar and Afza, 2014). Owing to these market
characteristics Pakistan has slipped to 127th place in 2014 from 74th in 2007 in the Doing
Business Ranking published annually by the World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation.
Corruption, which has grown considerably in the last three decades, is endemic,
pervasive and deeply entrenched (Saeed et al., 2015). It is another key factor in the Pakistani
economy that has repelled foreign as well as domestic investment. The international corruption
monitor (The World Justice Project) ranked Pakistan 106th among 113 countries in terms of
rule of law in 2016 (World Justice Project, 2016). According to Stevenson (2003), an estimated
30 percent of the price of all public works projects in Pakistan goes to kickbacks and bribes.
The reasons for such widespread corruption can be attributed to political instability, the absence
of the rule of law, poor regulatory quality, and the lack of accountability, just to mention a few.
As Noor (2009) has shown, since Pakistani independence in 1947, the civil and military
bureaucracies in Pakistan have continued strolling along the familiar paths of unbridled power,
unquestioned authority, and political patronage, thereby playing a major role in the escalating
corruption in the socio-political and economic spheres of the country.
Pakistan has suffered instability in its political climate due to the institutional clashes
since its very beginning. The military has constantly meddled in its national politics, whereas
the judicial system has also been accused of political bias (Shakeel, 2018). In the last two and
half decades, no elected prime-minister has been able to complete the full five year term. In
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and 1996), one elected government was dissolved in 1999 by the military and recently in 2012
and 2017 two elected prime ministers were disqualified by the judiciary. Consequently,
besieged with a feeling of uncertainty over their future, politicians have indulged in the
distribution of patronage to their connected firms as well as to self-enrichment.
3. Previous related work and hypotheses
The resource-based view of the firm argues that the firm’s competitive advantage originates
from its valuable resources that cannot easily be imitated by competitors (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Some of these resources may be intangible in nature and unique to the firm. Among these,
some may be relationship-based, such as those where the earnings potential depends on
stakeholder relationships (Godfrey, 2005). The political economy literature has long noted that
institutional resources, such as government institutions, officials and policies, can be captured
and exploited by individual firms in order to gain a competitive advantage (Bertrand et al.,
2018; Oberman, 2004). Anecdotal evidence indicates that political ties enable firms to build
government support in at least three ways. First, political connections may help firms to gain
preferential access to credit in the financial market at a lower cost. A number of recent studies
provide support for this assertion. For instance, Pan and Tian (2018) and Boubakri et al. (2008)
show that connected firms enjoy preferential treatment in the credit market and maintain higher
leverage ratios at lower interest rates. Second, firms can benefit from direct governmental
support in the form of receiving government contracts, reduced regulatory requirements, and
tax rebates. In this regard, Pan and Tian (2018) document that firms receive bank loans on the
basis of their political connections. Goldman et al. (2009) show that political connections
facilitate firms in receiving procurement contracts. Similarly, in the Indonesian market,
Mobarak and Purbasari (2006) revealed the role of political ties in granting import licenses at
the expense of their competitors. Lastly, connected firms even enjoy preferential treatment
from the judicial system in bankruptcy court proceedings. Faccio (2006) shows that politically
affiliated firms are more likely to be bailed out in the event of financial distress compared to
their non-connected counterparts. Indeed, Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that connected firms
have a 50% higher default rate and are more likely to write-off their loans from the courts.
3.1 Leverage and political connections
Anecdotal evidence shows that political connections are valuable for firms and that much of
this value comes from preferential access to debt. Extant literature has reported that firms with
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political connections enjoy exceptional access to government loans and are in turn more likely
to use excessive leverage in financing decisions (Pan and Tian, 2018; Saeed et al., 2015;
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Desai & Olofsgard, 2011; Claessens et al., 2008). This view depicts a
positive association between political connectedness and the level of financial leverage.
However, some studies also show the negative or complete lack of a link between political
connectedness and financial leverage (e.g., Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009).
Given the Pakistani context and following the widely held empirical findings, we expect a
positive relationship between political connections and leverage.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between political connections and leverage.
3.2 Excess cash and political connections
As shown by prior studies, connected firms benefit from easy access to finance and are more
likely to be bailed out in the event of financial distress (Boubakri et al. 2008; Faccio 2006; and
Khwaja and Mian, 2005). They are, therefore, unlikely to hoard large cash as a precautionary
or transactions motives 2(Hill et al., 2014). However, from the agency perspective, connected
firms are considered as poorly governed and subject to more severe agency problems (Chaney
et al., 2011). More specifically, poor corporate governance leads to higher accumulation of
cash balances in connected firms, particularly given that top management in connected firms
have to obey political objectives, which may clash with the shareholders’ wealth maximization
objectives (Boubakri et al., 2013). Additionally, boards within the connected firms are unable
to play their monitoring role due to political pressure (Faccio, 2010). Thus, easy access to credit
coupled with poor corporate governance may induce managers of connected firms to increase
their cash balances for use in the pursuit of political objectives at the expense of shareholders.
Importantly, considering the poor corporate governance and political instability in Pakistan
(mainly due to the outsized role of the military and judiciary in politics)3, it is expected that
connected firms are more likely to reap the immediate benefits from their connections instead
of waiting for future benefits. In this case, we suggest that rather than relying on political
2 The existing literature puts forth two main arguments for holding large cash balances: the transaction cost
motive and the precautionary cost motive (Hill et al., 2014; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). The former emphasises that
firms incur higher transaction costs to generate cash reserves and, therefore, tend to hold larger cash reserves. On
the other hand, the latter motive asserts that firms accumulate liquid assets to meet unexpected contingencies and
also to finance the future investments if the cost of external finance is prohibitively high. In contrast, Jensen (1986)
argues that large internal funds may increase the agency costs by enhancing the entrenched manager’s autonomy,
which consequently weakens the market discipline.
3 As discussed in section-2, in the last two and half decades, six elected governments were dissolveda direct
reflection of political instability and state of uncertainty in the Pakistani institutional setting.
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connections as a precautionary measure, connected firms in Pakistan amass large cash balances
that are facilitated by having easier access in credit market. Thus, considering poor corporate
governance and political uncertainty, we expect a positive relationship between political
connections and excess cash holding.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between political connections and excess cash
holding.
3.3 Accruals management and political connections
It is generally held that political connections lead to lower quality financial reporting.
According to this dominant view, political connections may cause agency problems by leading
management to manipulate earnings to hide the tunneling and expropriation of other
shareholders of corporate resources for political objectives (e.g., Xu et al., 2018; Aggarwal
et al., 2009; Khan et al., 2016; Boubakri et al., 2013 among others). For instance, Chaney, et
al. (2011) argue that politically connected firms face less market pressures to enhance the
quality of their financial and accounting information than non-connected firms. Therefore,
connected firms have a higher level of abnormal accruals. They affirm that politically
connected directors have generally more incentives to tunnel corporate resources for political
benefits, such as employment to their political supporters, promoting regional development by
locating production in politically desirable rather than economically suitable areas and for
campaign donations. To hide this expropriation, connected directors may lead managers to
manipulate earnings, which results in a lower quality of earnings. Furthermore, a higher cost
of debt as an incentive to improve the quality of their financial reporting is only pertinent to
non-politically connected firms. Likewise, Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) observe a negative link
between political connections and the quality of reported earnings and show that state-owned
firms, which are generally characterized as politically connected, are associated with higher
agency problems. This evidence suggests that connected firms have objectives other than
wealth maximization for which they need to tap corporate resources. The firms then use
earnings management to conceal these costs from the other stakeholders. However, another
point of view suggests that the risk of government expropriation leads connected firms to
maintain higher levels of accounting quality (Batta et al., 2014). Following the conclusions of
the mainstream literature, we expect to observe a negative relationship between political
connections and accounting quality and state our last hypothesis as follows:
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Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between political connections and the quality
of reported earnings (accruals quality).
4. Data and variable measurement
4.1. Data
The firm-level data used here is obtained from OSIRIS, which contains specific report format
data on the finances and board structure of over 70,000 globally listed firms. Next, our source
for business group affiliation is Rehman (2006) that provides a comprehensive list of large
business groups and their associated companies in the Pakistani market. Data on politicians is
required to identify the firm’s connections with politicians. To this end, we depend on the
database provided by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The ECP is responsible for
conducting elections on both National and Provincial levels and it maintains the data on
candidates participating in these elections, including candidates’ names, party association, and
electoral results. Given that two general elections (for national and provincial assemblies) held
during the last decade —2002 and 2008— we, therefore, selected the sample period from 2002
to 2010 to include both of these elections. In each election, there were around 848
constituencies (272 at national level and 577 at provincial level), with approximate 6 to 9
contestants in each constituency, which gives a grant sum of 10,500 candidates in both
elections.
The data spans 2002-2010 and includes all listed non-financial companies in Pakistan
during that period. To be included in the sample, each firm is required to report at least two
consecutive years’ financial data in order to observe the changes in the firm’s financing
structure. After applying this filter we are left with a sample of 403 firms with an unbalanced
panel of 2,328 firm-year observations. Of these firms, 116 are identified as politically
connected (defined above as a firm having a politician on the board). The politically affiliated
sub-sample is further divided based on electoral outcomes and this classification scheme yields
67 firms (57.75%) connected to winning politicians, and 81 firms (69.82%) related to
politicians belonging to a ruling party. Descriptive statistics on the sample firms is provided in
Table 1.
Our sample includes 28.87% of politically connected firms having 672 firm-year
observations. It includes 114 business group-affiliated firms and 289 stand-alone firms. Group-
affiliated firms constitute 28.28% of the overall sample and 55.17% of the connected firms.
Furthermore, the companies encompassing foreign ownership comprise 10.42% of the sample
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and close to 8% of the connected firms. The main industries include textile (36%) and basic
industries (16%).
4.2. Model
Since the aim of this study is to examine the influence that political connectedness asserts on
financial policies, we regress the financial policy variables on the variable indicating corporate
political connection and the control variables used in previous literature. Our empirical analysis
uses a regression model of the following general form:
  ,  =    +             ,  +     ,  +         + 	       +   ,  (1)
Y is the dependent variable indicating four financial policy variables. Connected is a
variable capturing the corporate political connectedness. To distinguish between the impact of
a politician’s influence on the financial policies of a connected firm, we use two additional
alternative measures for political connectedness. Connected1 is a dummy variable that takes 1
if the firm is connected to a politician who wins the elections and 0 otherwise. Connected2 is
a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is connected to a politician who is a member of the ruling
party and 0 otherwise. Collectively, Connected1 and Connected2 capture the politician winning
effect and the party winning effect, respectively. Z is a vector of firm-level control variables.
These control variables are independently discussed for each financial policy variable in the
next section. DumYear and DumInd represent year and industry dummies. Following Campbell
(1996) and Saeed et al. (2015), we reclassified two-digit SIC to a narrower one of eight industry
categories. These categories include: Food & Tobacco (Ind_Food), Basic industries including
Petroleum (Ind_Basic), Construction (Ind_Const), Textile & trade (Ind_Textile), Consumer
durables (Ind_Consumer), Transportation (Ind_Transp), Services (Ind_Services), and Others.
Thus, seven industry dummies are included in our model to control industry effects. The
regressions are carried out using the panel data regression model with heteroscedasticity-
consistent robust standard errors clustered at the firm’s level to control for serial correlation in
the residuals4.
4.3. Key variable measurement
4 We also assess the robustness of our results to the instrumental variable technique (Heckman two-stage analysis),
which will be discussed in the section 6.3.
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Leverage: The first dependent variable in this study is leverage. Most Pakistani firms do not
issue bonds to raise finance―due to the underdevelopment of the capital market― but rather 
use bank loans as a financing source (Ashraf and Ghani, 2005). Therefore, the leverage of
Pakistani firms is regarded as a bank loan and calculated as book value. In addition, Myers
(1977) justifies the use of book values on the basis that the book value of leverage relates to
the value of assets in place and does not normally include the capitalisation value of future
growth opportunities that makes book values a more stable measure. In this study, Leverage is
defined as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to the
total assets. We further divide leverage into long-term and short-term debt. Following Scherr
and Hulburt (2001), the long-term debt variable is calculated as long-term debt divided by its
total debts, where long-term leverage is measured as a firm’s debt maturing in more than one
year.
Excess cash holdings: Dittmar and Smith (2007) pointed out that raw “total cash holdings”
fails to account for the possibility of positive effects of sufficient cash resources needed for
daily operations. Poorly monitored managers may, however, waste excess cash, which is the
cash held above some optimal level. To estimate this optimal level, we regress total cash
holdings on a set of variables generally considered as important determinants of cash holdings.
Specifically, we adopt the cash holdings model used by Opler et al. (1999) and Dittmar et al.
(2003), which has the following form:
     ,  =    +      ,  +      ,  +       ,  +            ℎ ,  +               ,  +
        +        +   ,  (2)
where CASH is the ratio of cash to total assets, TA represents the natural logarithm of total
assets, CF is the cash flow measured as cash flow less capital expenditure less interest expense
divided by total assets, NWC represents net working capital calculated as current assets minus
cash and current liabilities divided by total assets. This measure is also used in earlier related
studies such as Ozkan and Ozkan (2004); Dittmar et al. (2003); and Opler et al. (1999). Net
working capital is considered as a cash substitute as it easily converted into cash
(Anagnostopoulou, 2013; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Therefore, firms with a
higher level of net working capital should have lower cash reserves. SaleGrowth indicates
sales growth which is the growth in the prior year’s sales, Liabilities is total liabilities divided
by total assets, DumYear are time dummies, DumInd are seven dummies at the two-digit level
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of SIC and ε is the error term. The residuals from the above equation are used to compute
excess cash, Excess Cash.
Accruals management: Following Kothari et al. (2005), and Hazarika et al. (2012), we
measure accruals management as the absolute value of abnormal accruals. This is because the
discretionary accruals can be utilized to increase or decrease reported earnings. For example,
to boost the equity based compensation and to make new equity issues more lucrative to outside
investors, the managers may manipulate earnings upwards. On the other hand, before a reissue
of options or share repurchase the managers have incentives to manipulate earnings downward.
Thus, we use the absolute value of abnormal accruals to estimate the extent of managerial
earnings manipulation. Additionally, to measure the impact of political connection on the level
of accruals we also use the original value of accruals.
Measurement of firm political connection: Following the literature on corporate political
connectedness (Lee & Wang, 2017; Shen & Lin, 2016; Faccio, 2006; Infante & Piaza, 2010;
Boubakri et al., 2013), a firm is defined as connected if it has a politician on its Board of
Directors. A politician is defined as any individual who stood in the national or provincial
elections. Data on politicians (electoral candidates that contested the elections of 2002 and
2008) is taken from Pakistan Election Commission. This politician dataset includes
comprehensive information on the candidates including their names, party affiliation, electoral
outcomes, and number of votes received by each candidate. Each politician is uniquely
identified by a combination of first and last name. In Pakistan, the first name includes both
given name and middle name, whereas the last name generally refers to the caste. For instance,
for Muhammad Ali Chaudary, the first name is Muhammad Ali and Chaudary is the caste
which is considered as a last name. It is extremely rare, if not impossible, for politicians to have
the same first and last/caste name. Nevertheless, as a preliminary test, we check and compare
the politicians’ names and found no anomalies. Information about Board of Directors is
obtained from OSIRIS database. In last, the complete names of directors are matched against
the name of each politician. If we get a precise match then that organization is considered as a
politically connected. In doing so, we found 116 politicians’ names were matched with the
directors’ names. Importantly, no politician was found to be associated with more than one
firm. Consequently, 116 firms were considered as politically affiliated firms5.
5 To avoid human error, the sample selection process (matching of politicians with the names of directors) is
performed by applying programming-code.
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5. Univariate comparison
For convenience Table 2 provides the empirical definition of the variables used in the analysis,
while Table 3 shows their descriptive statistics. In order to control for the potential influence
of outliers, all variables are winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentiles. The mean value of the
cash balances of the sample firms is Rs. 286,162 and the standard deviation is 601,539. The
average book leverage ratio of sample firms in their capital structure is 0.66 and the standard
deviation is 0.26. The long-term leverage ratio is lower with the mean and standard deviation
of 0.25 and 0.21, respectively. On average, sample firms hold 14% excess cash. The mean
value of accruals management (absolute abnormal accruals) is 10%. Once we split the sample
into politically connected and non-connected firms, it can be noted that the values of all
financial policy variables, except long-term debts, are higher for connected firms and this
difference is statistically significant. The findings suggest that politically connected firms
maintain a leverage ratio of 0.68, compared with a lower 0.63 for firms without connections.
This result is consistent with the argument of preferential treatment for connected firms in the
credit market. Similarly, the mean value of excess cash of connected firms is 17%, whilst that
of non-connected firms in only 11%. The mean abnormal accruals of the connected firms is
12%, compared to 9% for their non-connected counterparts. However, on average, long-term
debt, measured by long-term debt divided by total assets, is not statistically different.
It is found that firms with political ties are larger—measured by asset size—than non-
connected firms, which may explain their higher leverage in the capital structure. Moreover,
when compared to non-connected firms, connected firms are found to have more liquid assets
but show poor performance. In terms of ownership, connected firms are more domestically
owned and linked with business groups. These initial findings suggest that politically affiliated
firms have easy access to leverage, maintain large amounts of excess cash and show lower
quality accounting information, which indicates the presence of agency problems amongst
these firms.
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of our variables. Variables representing the
political connectedness are highly correlated with each other. Such high correlation is not
unexpected as the Connected1 and Connected2 are the subset of the Connected variable.
Besides, none of the independent variables show extreme correlation with each other, showing
that multicollinearity is not a serious concern in our regressions.
6. Empirical analysis
6.1. Main findings
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6.1.1. Determinants of corporate political connectedness
Some firm-level variables are more important than others in influencing the firm’s ability to
establish political connections. Therefore, it is important to examine which firm characteristics
are associated with recruiting a politician to join the board. To investigate the determinants of
a firm being politically connected, we estimate a probit model whose dependent variable is
political connections which is one of the three political connections indicators (connected,
connected1, and connected2). Specifically, the dummy variable of political connection is
regressed against the following variables: firm size, profitability, tangible assets, growth
opportunities, foreign ownership, business group affiliation, firm quality, tax rate, liabilities,
dividend payment, net working capital, large shareholders%, and board independence.
Moreover, an additional variable, the extent of political connections in the connected firm’s
industry (indus_connection) is also used to control the industry effect. Industries that are
heavily regulated and interact with the government are more likely to establish political
connections. The measures of all variables are defined in Table 2.
Results presented in Table 5 indicate that firm size, business group affiliation,
liabilities, the large shareholdings and extent of political connectedness in an industry have a
significant positive influence on the probability that the firm will appoint a politician to the
board in Pakistan. It indicates that larger size, business group affiliation, higher liabilities, large
shareholdings, and greater extent of politically connected firms in the industry increases a
firm’s likelihood of establishing political connections. Moreover, the estimates suggest that
low performance and dividend non-payment increases a firm’s probability of political
connectedness. Regarding industries, firms that belong to construction, textile, and
transportation are more likely to establish political connections. These findings are generally
consistent with earlier research using international data (e.g., Faccio 2006; Boubakri et al.,
2013).
6.1.2. Capital structure
We start our analysis with the capital structure decision. There are a number of control variables
used in the earlier studies that tend to influence the amount of leverage, including size,
collateral, profitability, growth opportunities, ownership, business group affiliation, large-
shareholders and board-independence. The analysis was restricted to these factors owing to the
fact that they have been consistently employed in the earlier studies on capital structure (e.g.,
Pan and Tian, 2018; Fraser et al., 2006; Charumilind et al., 2006). We define firm size as the
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natural logarithm of annual sales revenue (total sales). It is a widely used proxy in the earlier
studies such as Dand et al. (2018); Moosa and Li (2012); Singh and Davidson (2003) and Calof
(1994). The ratio of fixed property, plant and equipment to total assets is used. Trade-off theory
suggests that firms use tangible assets as a guaranty of loan (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Pecking
order theory also suggests a positive relationship between the amount of physical assets and
leverage and further suggests that collateral reduces information asymmetry between borrower
and lender6. Firm profitability is measured by profit before taxes, divided by total assets. The
predictions on profitability are ambiguous. Pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) suggests that
firms first utilize retained earnings for new investments then move to debt and equity, if
required. Following the prediction of Pecking order theory profitable firms are able to generate
sufficient cash therefore they must prefer retained earnings over debt and equity. This suggests
a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. In contrast, Trade-off theory
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958) predicts that profitable firms should use more leverage to offset
corporate taxes. There are two corporate decisions that might directly influence the nexus
between profitability and leverage: repurchasing of shares and dividend payment7. In case of a
developing country like Pakistan, repurchasing of shares is a new phenomenon. The Securities
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan issued a regulation in August 2016, Listed Companies
(Buy-Back of Shares) Regulations, for listed firms to repurchase their shares. On the other
hand, dividend payment is not mandatory in Pakistan and minority shareholders are often
neglected due to poor corporate governance (Ahmed and Javad, 2009). Consequently, Pakistani
listed firms are not very keen to pay dividends (Naeem and Nasr, 2007). Considering the above
trends of the Pakistani market, it is safe to assume that the impacts of repurchasing of shares
and dividend payment decisions would not influence the relationship between profitability and
leverage. In addition, the market-to-book ratio is included as a proxy for growth opportunities.
Myers (1977) argues that shareholders have an incentive to forgo value-enhancing investment
opportunities if the payoffs of the investment accrue to debtholders, resulting in an
underinvestment problem. To remedy this underinvestment problem, shareholders will lower
the level of leverage. Thus, a negative relationship exists between leverage and growth
opportunities. Empirical studies, by and large, support this relationship (see Frank and Goyal
(2005) for a survey). Importantly, a seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1995) also shows a
6 The Trade-off theory originated with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) famous proposition, while the Pecking
order theory was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984).
7 We are grateful to the referee for pointing out this issue.
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negative relationship between growth opportunities, measured as the market-to-book ratio, and
leverage in G7 countries8. Furthermore, a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if at least
10% of its stock is foreign owned, is used to control the effect of foreign ownership.9 Finally,
the business group effect is controlled by a dummy that equals 1 if a firm is affiliated with the
top 30 Pakistani business groups operating in the non-financial sector (based on their sizes)
identified in Rehman (2006) and zero otherwise. In line with Su and Fung (2013) and Wu et
al. (2012), we employ three variables in our model to measure the corporate governance
mechanisms, namely, large-shareholders, board-independence and CEO duality. Large
shareholding is measured by the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders. Board
independence is the number of independent directors divided by total number of directors.
Lastly, CEO duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the same person holds the
positions of CEO and board chair, and zero otherwise. A widely held view is that boards can
perform their monitoring role better when the chair of the board is not occupied by the CEO
(Jensen, 1986). Consequently, a strong board may prefer more leverage that serves as a
disciplining device. Empirical evidence, such as Jiraporn et al. (2012) and Berger et al. (1997),
also support this notion and show a negative relationship between CEO duality and the use of
leverage. On the other hand, Zwiebel (1994) documents that powerful managers use more
leverage and engage in a greater degree of empire building. In sum, the direction of the
relationship between CEO duality and leverage is contentious.
Some unobservable firm-level variables may be influencing both the ability to establish
political connections and corporate financing policies which may cause an endogenity issue.
To alleviate the endogeneity concern— we estimate our results using the Heckman (1979) two-
stage model. In the first stage, a probit model is estimated to predict the likelihood that a firm
establishes political connections. More specifically, a 0, 1 dummy variable indicating the firm’s
political connectedness is regressed against the same independent variables used in Model 1
along with one additional (instrumental) variable that differentiates the firm’s political
connectedness. In the search for a valid instrument we aim to find an exogenous variable that
is economically correlated with the political connections variable but not with financial
policies. In the spirit of earlier studies such as Ferris et al., (2016) and Wang et al. (2016) the
extent of political connections in the connected firm’s industry (Indus_connection) is taken as
a discerning instrumental variable for political connections. Specifically, it is defined as the
8 However, Chen and Zhao (2006) contend that the relation between the growth opportunities (market-to-book
ratio) and leverage is non-monotonic.
9 We follow Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) and Kimura and Kiyota (2007) in defining foreign ownership.
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number of connected firms in a given industry divided by the total number of firms in that
industry. There is a concern that industries which are heavily regulated and interact more often
with the politicians are more likely to establish political connection which may bias our
estimation10. In our case, the proportion of politically connected firms in regulated industries
such as petroleum, telecom (services), and tobacco is very low. As shown in panel (c) of Table
1, five politically connected firms (out of 17) belong to the petroleum sector, only one
connected firm is from tobacco industry, two firms are from telecoms and one from the power
sector. So, collectively in our sample nine connected firms are from regulated industries. One
important reason for such a small proportion of connected firms from the regulated sector is
the dominance of multinational firms in the telecom and petroleum sectors. As such,
multinational firms are generally known to use their influence and political pressure in
developing countries to change policies favorably instead of bringing politicians onto boards
(Kapfer, 2006). Hence, considering a small set of connected firms from the regulated sectors,
the separate treatment of the regulated sector is not necessary in our analysis and utilization of
Indus_connection as an instrumental variable will not bias our results. In the second-stage
analysis, the measures of political connection (Connected, Connected1, and Connected2) are
replaced with the fitted value of political connections, obtained from the first-stage probit
model. Results of the first-stage are shown in Table 5 and discussed in the previous section
(‘determinants of corporate political connections).
Table 6 shows the second-stage regression results of the Heckman two-stage model for
firm leverage. The results in column (1) show that the estimated coefficient on Connected is
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 1
and suggests that, on average, politically connected firms have more leverage compared to non-
connected firms11. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in
political connection would lead to an increase in leverage by 7.04% (i.e., (0.101×0.46)/0.66).
Our empirical findings are consistent with Pan and Tian (2018), Ebrahim et al., (2014), Faccio
(2006), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Dinç (2005) and Charumilind et al. (2006), all of whom
illustrate the higher borrowing of connected firms. Firms with higher tangible assets, larger
size, lower growth, and business group affiliation have, ceteris paribus, higher leverage. Firms
10 We are grateful to the referee for pointing this out.
11 We also conducted the regression analysis for the impact of a politician on short-term and long-term debt
separately. Our results (untabulated) show a statistically insignificant impact of corporate political connections on
short-term debt, whereas a positive and significant effect is found on long-term debt.
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belonging to basic industries (including petroleum), construction, and textile sectors utilize
more leverage.
Next, in column (2) the coefficient of Connected1 is positive and significant implying
that if a narrower definition of political connection (which captures politician winning effect)
is used, we obtain a stronger association between connections and leverage. In terms of
economic significance, results indicate that connections with winning politician would lead to
an increase in leverage by 8%. In column (3), the relation between Connected2 (party winning
effect) and leverage is found to be positive and significant with an even larger economic
significance of 9.4%. The results show that the inverse Mills ratio (λ) is significant in column 
(3) indicating the significance of controlling the self-selection bias in the analysis. Overall,
these results support our contention that a winning politician and a politician belonging to a
winning party confer even larger political benefits. Largely, our results validate the resource-
based perspective, which advocates the inclusion of directors with a political background as a
means of bringing external resources to the organization. In this respect, the politically
affiliated directors influence banks and other lending institutions to provide connected firms a
privileged access to external finance.
6.1.3. Excess cash holdings
In this section, we test whether the connections have any effects on excess cash holdings. For
our analysis, the choices of variables representing firm characteristics that may influence the
cash holdings decision are based on the related literature, such as Dittmar et al. (2003), Ozkan
and Ozkan (2004), Belghitar and Khan (2013) and Saeed et al. (2014). More specifically, the
following control variables are employed for our reduced form regression: size, growth
opportunities, net working capital, dividend payment, liabilities, business group affiliation,
large-shareholders and board independence.
Firm size is used as a proxy for a takeover deterrent. At the same time firm size is also
considered as an inverse proxy for information asymmetry and, in turn, the cost of external
capital (Dittmar et al., 2003). Accordingly, large firms are more likely to hold less excess cash
compared to smaller firms. A dummy variable is introduced to capture the effect of the dividend
policy on cash holdings (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Firms with growth opportunities prefer to
retain their earnings as cash to avoid situations in which they give up profitable investment
opportunities due to short of cash (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). The growth opportunities of firms
are measured by the market-to-book ratio. Furthermore, firm net working capital is included in
the model to control other essential financial characteristics of each firm. It is reasonable to
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presume that the conversion of non-cash liquid assets into cash is much easier and cheaper
compared to other assets. Therefore, firms having a sufficient level of liquid assets may not
have to turn to the external capital markets to raise finance when they have lower cash reserves.
Net working capital can therefore be considered as a cash substitute. Earlier studies (e.g.
Khanna and Palepu, 2000) documented that the business groups maintain an internal capital
market to transfer resources among affiliated firms. This is particularly true in developing
countries where business group affiliation is generally deemed as an antidote for market
imperfections. Therefore, a variable, business group affiliation, is included in the model to
control for the impact of group affiliation. Finally, large-shareholders, board-independence,
and CEO duality are used as corporate governance mechanisms.
The regression results from the Heckman sample selection model are shown in Table 7
where Excess Cash is used as the dependent variable in the second stage. The R-square of the
unreported regression results of equation (1) is 26% which indicates the explanatory power of
the model as satisfactory. The explanatory power of our model is comparable to other studies
conducted in the context of developed countries, for instance 25% in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004);
19.1% in Harford et al. (2008). In column (1), the results show that the coefficient on Connected
is positive and significant. More specifically, it suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in connections leads to an increase in excess cash of 5% (i.e. (0.021×0.46)/0.19). Regarding
the control variables, our results are very similar to Dittmar et al. (2003). Managers like to hold
larger excess cash if the size of the firm is small, pays no dividend, maintains low liabilities
and has fewer independent directors on their boards. Net working capital is not found to have
a significant relationship with excess cash holdings. Firms belonging to consumer and services
industries hold more cash, whereas textile sector firms hold less. The estimations provided in
columns (2) with Connected1 and in column (3) with Connected2 show the positive and
significant impact of political connections on the level of cash reverses. Economically, the
party winning effect is larger than the politician winning effect (5.8% vs. 7.9%). Considering
the economic significance, it can be suggested that politicians confer even more advantages to
connected firms when they win the election or belong to the winning party. The results in Table
7 consistently show that political connections have a positive effect on excess cash reserves,
supporting our Hypothesis 2, which asserts that connected firms hold more cash than their non-
connected peers.
The preferential access to external finance further exacerbates the tendency of
connected firms to engage in stockpiling cash. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a
complementary effect of connections on the amount of cash reserves. Our finding is in line
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with those of Boubakri et al. (2013), Kusnadi (2011), Saeed et al. (2014) and Dittmar et al.
(2003), who show that firms with greater agency problems hold larger cash balances.
Considering these arguments and earlier evidence, it is safe to conclude that higher excess cash
holdings among connected firms signal the presence of agency problems.
6.1.4. Accruals management
In this section, we examine how much of the firm’s abnormal accounting accruals can be
attributed to political connections. We use the absolute value of abnormal accruals to assess
managers’ attempts to manipulate earnings in both directions. In robustness tests, we also
employ the original value of accruals to confirm and contrast our findings with related studies.
We evaluate the association between the political connections and accruals management after
controlling for the impact of other relevant variables. The use of control variables, namely,
size, leverage, volatility in sales, growth opportunities, large-shareholders, board-
independence and CEO duality is based on their relevance to accruals management and is in
line with the earlier studies (e.g. Datta et al., 2013; Dejong and Ling, 2013, Park and Shin,
2004).
Table 8 presents the estimates of the Heckman selection model. In panel A, the
dependent variable is absolute abnormal accruals (Abnormal Accruals). Column (1) reports the
results of the regression of discretionary accruals on the indication of political connectedness
and controls. The results for the entire sample show that the coefficient on Connected is positive
and statistically significant confirming our hypothesis 3; indicating that politically connected
firms are associated with a higher level of discretionary accruals, i.e. a lower quality of reported
earnings12. The economic significance of these results can be interpreted as a one standard
deviation increase in connections would lead to an increase of 3.98% in the absolute values of
accruals. We re-estimate the regression with the dependent variable, original value of accruals.
Findings for the original value of accruals are shown in panel B. In Panel B, the results show
that political connections interact positively and significantly with the original values of
accruals. The economic significance shows that a one standard deviation increase in
connections leads to an increase in the original values of accruals by 3.8%. The estimated
coefficients on the control variables indicate that small, growing, and financially constrained
firms engage more in discretionary accruals management. Regarding sectorial effects,
construction and services industries exert negative and positive effects, respectively, on the
12 Recall that a positive sign on Connected indicates that connected firms have greater incentives to manipulate
earnings for political purposes, which in turn deteriorate the accruals quality.
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quality of reporting. These results are indicative of the agency problems and corroborate
evidence in Xu et al, (2018); Kostovetsky (2015); Chaney et al. (2011) and Ben-Nasr et al.
(2015), who find that the quality of the accruals of politically connected firms is poorer than
that of non-connected firms.
Next, we turn to examine the impact of political strength of connected politicians. In
columns (2) and (3), we observe positive and significant coefficients on Connected1 and
Connected2, respectively. The economic significance of a winning politician (4.4%) and a
winning party (5.9%) indicate that the earnings management decision is also driven in large
part by the impact of politicians related to the ruling party. For the original value of accruals,
we find that Connected1 and Connected2 exert a positive economic impact (3.1% and 5.7%,
respectively). The significance level is low but results are qualitatively similar to the findings
of absolute values.
Collectively, our results indicate that corporate political connections bring costs and
benefits. On the one hand, we find that connected directors enhance the organizational resource
base by providing more credit with longer maturity. On the other hand, political directors use
their increased power to weaken corporate governance, leading to distortions in cash holdings
and accruals management decisions. In sum, the appointment of a politician to a board is an
important source of financial resources for a firm but these resources entail costs reflected in
higher agency problems.
6.2. Robustness checks
6.2.1. Alternative measures of dependent variables
To ascertain that our results are not specific to the measures of financial policies (dependent
variables) selected here, we repeat the regressions reported in Tables 6-8 with alternative
measures of the dependent variables. More specifically, following John and Litov (2010), we
use a market based value of leverage which is measured as the total debt divided by the market
value of assets (equal to total assets minus book equity plus market value of equity). The cash
holdings variable, akin to Chen et al. (2011), is proxied by free cash flow which is defined as
cash flow from operations minus cash dividends and scaled by total assets instead of excess
cash holdings. Lastly, we take the difference between firm’s earnings and cash flows, as in
Chava and Puranndum (2010), to measure the extent of the quality of financial reporting. We
consult the cash flow statements to construct the accruals management variable.
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The results, as reported in Panel A of Table 9, show that political connections continue
to be positively and significantly associated with all the new financial proxy measures. Further,
the impact of political strength remains positive and statistically significant. Although the
statistical significance tends to be low for capital structure and cash holdings, the results
generally conform to those presented earlier. In sum, the results reinforce our basic inferences
on the strong, significant effect of political connections on corporate financial decisions and
indicate that our main results are robust to how financial policies are being measured.
6.2.2. Inclusion of other measures of corporate governance
The impact of political connections on a firm’s financial policies could be reduced if the firms
are externally scrutinized. In this regard, Boubakri et al. (2013) argue that the increased scrutiny
associated with the analysts and foreign investors discourages politically connected directors
from influencing financial decisions. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) report that Indonesian
politically affiliated firms are less inclined to access global capital markets because expanded
disclosure and additional scrutiny come with foreign securities. In light of this, we use a dummy
variable, Foreign Listing, that takes value 1 if the firm is listed abroad and 0 otherwise, to
control the foreign listing status. To capture how impact of political connections on financial
policies varies across foreign listed and unlisted firms, we introduce an interactive term
(between foreign listing and measure of political connection) in the model. The results are
displayed in Panel B of Table 9. The introduction of the interactive term does not significantly
alter our earlier results. In each of the models, the value of political connections is statistically
significant and has the expected sign. In addition, the estimated coefficients on Connected1
and Connected2 are statistically significant, similar in magnitude and have the same sign. The
interactive term is negative and statistically significant only for leverage indicating that
connected firms listed in foreign markets are less likely to increase their leverage as compared
to their connected peers listed only in Pakistan. Altogether, the role of political connections is
robust to the inclusion of additional variables of corporate governance.
6.2.3. Alternative estimation techniques
To further check the robustness of our estimated results two additional estimators are
considered. First, to minimize the endogeneity concerns between firm policies and political
connections, our empirical strategy is based on the cross-sectional approach, suggested by
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Belghitar and Khan (2013), and Khwaja and Mian (2005). The
cross-section technique involves regressing the financial variables on an average of the
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variables over time. More specifically, the cross-sectional model uses the dependent policy
variables measured as of 2010, the average values of each of the firm’s characteristics over the
period 2002-2009 are used as independent variables. The results presented in Panel C of Table
9 confirm the previous findings. The positive relationship between political connections and
financing policies remains statistically significant. Second, we use the random-effect model
with both time and industry dummies that controls for industry heterogeneity and also controls
for the effects of the time-invariant variables included in the model. In all regressions,
presented in Panel C, our main results for political connections remain stable. Thus, we can
conclude that our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques.
7. Conclusion
The present paper investigates the impact of political connections on corporate financial policy
including capital structure, maturity structure, excess cash holdings, and accruals management.
Using data on Pakistani firms from 2002 to 2010, our results show that political connections
lead firms to utilize more leverage in their capital structure, hold larger excess cash balances
and increase accruals management. The impact of political connections on corporate financial
policy escalates with the strength of the connected politician. Importantly, we find that the
winning party effect is more pronounced than the winning politician effect. The results are
robust to alternative measures of financial policies, different sample selection, alternative
estimation techniques and the inclusion of other measures of corporate governance.
Overall, we deduce two theoretical patterns from these results. First, politicians can
bring external resources to the organization, which supports the resource-based view of
political connections. Second, political connectedness undermines corporate governance and
causes agency problems that are reflected in excess cash holdings and increased accruals
management.
While our study is not aimed at resolving the debate about whether establishing political
connections on board is necessary or even desirable, we do provide empirical evidence that
political relationships do play an important role in the way firms make financial decisions.
Although connections bring financial resources to a firm, they come at a cost to shareholders
in the form of excess cash holdings and lower quality earnings reports.
It is important to mention that the focus on a single developing country enables us to
ground the major theoretical construct that shapes the relationships of interest within a context.
However, it limits us in generalizing the results to other settings as the corporate connection-
policies nexus may reveal different strengths or directions in other contexts due to institutional
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stability, shareholders’ protection, financial market development, and transparency standards
across countries.
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Table 1: Description of sample
A. Distribution of sample
Total sample Connected firms Non-connected firms
# % # % # %
Total number of firms 403 100 116 28.78 287 71.21
Group-affiliates 114 28.28 64 55.17 50 17.42
Stand-alone 289 71.72 52 44.83 237 82.58
Foreign owned 42 10.42 9 7.75 33 11.49
Domestic owned 361 89.58 107 92.25 254 88.51
B. Distribution of politically connected firms by electoral outcomes
# %
Connected to winner 67 57.75
Connected to looser 49 42.25
Connected to winning party 81 69.82
Connected to opposition party 35 30.18
C. Distribution of sample across industries
Total sample Connected firms Non-connected firms
# % # % # %
Food & Tobacco 48 11.91 11φ 9.48 37 12.89
Basic industries including
petroleum
67 16.63 17φφ 14.66 50 17.42
Construction 61 15.14 18 15.52 43 14.98
Textiles & Trade 146 36.23 39 33.62 107 37.28
Consumer durables 33 8.19 12 10.34 21 7.32
Transportation 16 3.97 8 6.90 8 2.79
Services (telecom) 11 2.73 4φφφ 3.45 7 2.44
Others 21 5.21 7 6.03 14 4.88
φ Among these 11 connected firms, 1 firm belongs to tobacco sector, remaining 10 belongs to food industries.
φφ 5 firms belong to petroleum sector, rest 12 are from basic industries. φφφ 2 firms belong to telecom sector
and 1 from power sector.
Table 2: Variables definitions
Variables Definition
Connected A firm is defined as connected if it has a politician on its Board of
Directors. A politician is defined as any individual who stood in
the national or provincial elections.
Connected1 A dummy variable that equals one if the connected politician wins
the election and zero if otherwise
Connected2 A dummy that equals one if the connected politician is a member
of ruling party and zero otherwise.
Leverage The book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to
the total assets
Long-term Debt Long-term debt divided by its total debt.
Excess Cash Obtained from equation 2 residuals.
Abnormal accruals Absolute value of abnormal accruals.
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the annual sales revenue (total sale) of the
firm.
Tangible Assets Fraction of fixed assets to total assets.
Profitability Profitability is measured as income before taxes divided by total
assets.
Growth Opportunities The market-to-book ratio calculated as the market value of equity
plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total
assets.
Foreign Ownership A dummy variable that equals one if at least 10% of its stock is
foreign owned and zero if otherwise.
Business Group Affiliation A dummy variable that equals one if the firm belongs to a business
group and zero if otherwise.
Firm Quality The difference between earnings per share t+1 and t, divided by
share price in year t.
Tax Rate The ratio of total tax charge to total taxable income
Liabilities Total liability divided by total assets, where total liability includes
both financial and operational liabilities. Liabilities include both
interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing liabilities. Non-interest
bearing liabilities include accounts payable, salary payable, taxes
payable/deferred taxes, other contractual liabilities, and accruals
(accrued income taxes, other expenses accrued but unpaid).
Dividend payment A dummy variable that equals one if firm pays dividend in a
current year and zero otherwise.
Net Working Capital Working capital minus cash divided by net assets.
Large Shareholders% The percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders.
Board Independence The ratio of independent directors divided by total number of
directors.
Table 3: Summary statistics of variables
Total sample Connected firms Non-connected firms Mean difference
Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max (t-statistics)
Cash 286,162 601,539 3064 2106,094 294,083 577,005 3867 2106,094 281,590 630,058 3064 2099,570 -4.09***
Total Accruals 0.19 0.25 0.04 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.04 0.31 0.17 0.24 0.05 0.30 -1.61***
Leverage 0.66 0.26 0.22 1.26 0.68 0.24 0.22 1.26 0.63 0.25 0.22 1.23 -3.31***
Long-term Debt 0.39 0.31 0.01 1.00 0.42 0.32 0.01 1.00 0.38 0.31 0.01 1.00 -1.99***
Excess Cash 0.19 0.30 0.01 0.45 0.17 0.40 0.01 0.45 0.11 0.25 0.02 0.39 -6.01***
Absolute Accruals 0.59 0.45 0.02 0.78 0.60 0.44 0.03 0.78 0.58 0.48 0.02 0.77 -1.39***
Firm Size 6.32 0.64 5.11 7.51 6.36 0.63 5.15 7.44 6.30 0.66 5.11 7.51 -1.56*
Tangible Assets 0.51 0.20 0.09 0.85 0.50 0.21 0.09 0.84 0.49 0.21 0.12 0.85 -0.72
Profitability 5.89 10.88 -13.76 12.31 4.41 10.31 -13.50 12.31 6.67 11.09 -13.76 11.85 4.59***
Growth Opportunities 8.14 5.79 1.05 11.46 8.29 5.90 1.05 11.46 8.12 5.74 0.98 10.21 -0.61
Foreign Ownership 0.12 0.35 0 1 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 3.26***
Business Group Affiliation 0.32 0.52 0 1 0.48 0.64 0 1 0.19 0.42 0 1 -11.04***
Firm Quality 0.03 0.42 -7.68 16.05 0.03 0.41 -7.68 16.05 0.03 0.42 -7.53 15.99 0.30
Tax Rate 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.53 0.20 0.13 0.01 0.46 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.53 0.64
Liabilities 1.08 0.50 0.45 1.39 1.13 0.61 0.46 1.39 1.01 0.55 0.45 1.37 -3.01**
Dividend Payment 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.36
Net Working Capital 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.19 1.21
Large Shareholders (%) 0.30 0.07 0.01 0.82 0.34 0.08 0.01 0.79 0.27 0.06 0.01 0.82 -1.54
Board Independence 0.36 0.04 0.19 0.67 0.36 0.04 0.19 0.64 0.39 0.03 0.21 0.67 0.13
The mean and standard deviation of political connection variables are as follows: Connected: 0.31 and 0.46; Connected1: 0.18 and 0.41; and Connected2: 0.25 and 0.43.
The definition of all variables is provided in Table 2.
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Table 4: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Connected 1
2. Connected1 0.71 1
3. Connected2 0.79 0.63 1
4. Cash 0.25 0.20 0.18 1
5. Total Accruals 0.16 0.29 0.32 -0.14 1
6. Leverage 0.51 0.56 0.41 -0.21 0.02 1
7. Long-term Debt 0.44 0.49 0.58 -0.19 0.01 0.38 1
8. Excess Cash 0.29 0.27 0.33 0.38 0.14 0.11 0.09 1
9. Abnormal Accruals 0.20 0.17 0.34 -0.09 0.28 0.02 0.01 0.23 1
10. Firm Size 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.30 0.22 0.50 0.35 0.12 0.19 1
11. Tangible Assets 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.36 0.40 0.06 0.11 0.44 1
12. Profitability 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.41 0.03 -0.28 -0.24 0.25 0.26 0.39 0.30 1
13. Growth Opportunities 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.30 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.26 0.23 0.31 1
14. Foreign Ownership -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.04 -0.23 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.19 1
15. Business Group Affiliation 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.20 0.15 0.42 0.33 -0.14 1
16. Firm Quality 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.12 -0.04 0.10 0.05 -0.08 0.01 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.02 0.10 0.18 1
17. Tax Rate 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.24 0.01 0.13 0.25 0.01 0.19 -0.15 0.30 0.12 -0.09 1
18. Liabilities 0.36 0.43 0.34 -0.18 -0.19 0.47 0.39 -0.02 -0.15 0.38 0.41 -0.21 0.12 -0.13 0.25 -0.10 0.20 1
19. Dividend Payment 0.15 0.14 0.10 -0.32 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19 -0.21 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.09 0.10 -0.12 -0.15 -0.21 1
20. Net Working Capital 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.14 -0.25 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.10 1
21. Large Shareholders (%) 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.17 -0.22 0.13 0.11 0.01 -0.19 0.29 0.35 0.15 0.09 -0.11 0.20 0.26 -0.00 0.17 0.25 0.16 1
22. Board Independence -0.16 -0.19 -0.27 -0.26 -0.14 0.10 0.17 0.20 -0.31 0.15 0.24 0.38 0.18 0.27 -0.03 0.21 0.01 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.24
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Table 5: Determinants of corporate political connections
This table presents the probit model estimates. The dependent variable is political connections
which is one of the three political connections indicators (connected, connected1, and connected2).
Standard errors are reported in brackets.*Significant at 10% **Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1%.
Variables Connected Connected1 Connected2
Firm Size 0.290***
(0.041)
0.315***
(0.060)
0.301***
(0.036)
Profitability -0.043***
(0.005)
-0.041***
(0.008)
-0.041***
(0.012)
Tangible Assets 0.055
(0.246)
0.069
(0.178)
0.060
(0.140)
Growth Opportunities -0.110
(0.416)
-0.080
(0.216)
-0.094
(0.239)
Foreign Ownership 0.018
(0.053)
0.014
(0.025)
0.017
(0.049)
Business Group Affiliation 0.022***
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.003)
0.019***
(0.002)
Firm Quality -0.020
(0.073)
-0.018
(0.059)
-0.018
(0.040)
Tax Rate 0.011
(0.025)
0.008
(0.019)
0.013
(0.051)
Liabilities 1.075***
(0.160)
1.060***
(0.205)
1.114***
(0.176)
Dividend Payment -0.026***
(0.005)
-0.024***
(0.005)
-0.025***
(0.004)
Net Working Capital 2.137
(4.508)
1.991
(5.471)
2.014
(3.753)
Large Shareholders 0.050***
(0.009)
0.051***
(0.013)
0.055***
(0.010)
CEO Duality 0.006
(0.014)
0.006
(0.024)
0.004
(0.019)
Indus_Connection 0.109***
(0.023)
0.095***
(0.015)
0.101***
(0.021)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Ind_Food -0.535
(1.610)
-0.580
(2.004)
-0.501
(2.056)
Ind_Basic 0.345
(0.832)
0.402
(1.125)
0.368
(0.987)
Ind_Const 0.239***
(0.025)
0.265***
(0.055)
0.251***
(0.039)
Ind_Textile 0.517***
(0.049)
0.502***
(0.038)
0.534***
(0.034)
Ind_Consumer -0.071
(0.243)
-0.063
(0.307)
-0.076
(0.220)
Ind_Transp 0.190***
(0.022)
0.185***
(0.017)
0.192***
(0.015)
Ind_Services -1.043
(6.782)
-1.050
(7.041)
-1.036
(5.302)
N. 2328 2328 2328
Pseudo R-square 0.22 0.18 0.20
38
Table 6: The effects of political connections on corporate leverage
This table presents second stage regression estimates from a Hackman two-stage regression of book
leverage of the firm on political connections and all other control variables. Standard errors are reported
in brackets. ***, **, And * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Variables (I) (II) (III)
Connected 0.101***
(0.023)
Connected 1 0.129***
(0.018)
Connected2 0.145***
(0.030)
Firm Size 0.014***
(0.009)
0.012***
(0.011)
0.015***
(0.018)
Tangible Assets 0.059***
(0.010)
0.063**
(0.008)
0.060**
(0.015)
Profitability -0.096***
(0.021)
-0.098**
(0.014)
-0.100**
(0.030)
Growth Opportunities -0.157**
(0.048)
-0.140**
(0.050)
-0.164*
(0.081)
Foreign Ownership -0.012
(0.030)
-0.014
(0.041)
-0.009
(0.015)
Business Group Affiliation 0.310***
(0.049)
0.331***
(0.074)
0.357***
(0.030)
Large Shareholders 0.110
(0.283)
0.096
(0.341)
0.102
(0.263)
Board Independence 0.002***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
CEO Duality 0.048
(0.115)
0.057
(0.090)
0.056
(0.212)
Inverse Mills ratio(λ) 0.030
(0.055)
0.033
(0.071)
0.023*
(0.012)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Ind_Food -0.014
(0.050)
-0.011
(0.036)
-0.020
(0.064)
Ind_Basic 0.049*
(0.023)
0.052*
(0.026)
0.050*
(0.025)
Ind_Const 0.604***
(0.091)
0.588***
(0.105)
0.599***
(0.120)
Ind_Textile 0.112***
(0.014)
0.108***
(0.023)
0.119***
(0.020)
Ind_Consumer -0.005
(0.010)
-0.008
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.008)
Ind_Transp 1.102
(1.496)
1.085
(2.723)
1.110
(3.602)
Ind_Services -0.000
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
N. 2328 2328 2328
R-square 0.246 0.219 0.232
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Table 7: The effects of political connections on excess cash holdings
This table presents second stage regression estimates from a Hackman two-stage regression of cash
holdings on political connections and all other control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
***, **, And * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Variables (I) (II) (III)
Connected 0.021***
(0.012)
Connected1 0.027***
(0.021)
Connected2 0.035***
(0.016)
Firm Size -0.034**
(0.010)
-0.032**
(0.009)
-0.029**
(0.010)
Net Working Capital -0.051
(0.176)
-0.055
(0.248)
-0.058
(0.194)
Growth Opportunities 0.009
(0.020)
0.010
(0.013)
0.010
(0.014)
Dividend Payment -0.112*
(0.055)
-0.097*
(0.043)
-0.118*
(0.057)
Liabilities -0.109***
(0.013)
-0.107***
(0.022)
-0.113***
(0.010)
Business Group Affiliation 0.075
(0.210)
0.060
(0.111)
0.081
(0.249)
Large Shareholders 0.009
(0.026)
0.010
(0.014)
0.012
(0.030)
Board Independence -0.004***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002***
(0.000)
CEO Duality -0.012
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.050)
-0.010
(0.018)
Inverse Mills ratio(λ) 0.004
(0.009)
0.010
(0.016)
0.006
(0.019)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Ind_Food -0.011
(0.042)
-0.009
(0.056)
-0.013
(0.035)
Ind_Basic 0.108
(0.351)
0.116
(0.405)
0.105
(0.534)
Ind_Const 0.152***
(0.018)
0.147***
(0.030)
0.151***
(0.022)
Ind_Textile -0.016***
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.004)
-0.018***
(0.002)
Ind_Consumer 1.134***
(0.201)
1.098***
(0.136)
1.110***
(0.095)
Ind_Transp 0.002
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Ind_Services 0.008*
(0.003)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.005*
(0.002)
N. 2328 2328 2328
R-square 0.212 0.195 0.231
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Table 8: The effects of political connections on accruals management
This table presents second stage regression estimates from a Hackman two-stage regression of absolute and actual
accruals on political connections and all other control variables. Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, And
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A: Absolute accruals Panel B: Original accruals
Variables (I) (II) (III) (I) (II) (III)
Connected 0.051***
(0.008)
0.034*
(0.016)
Connected1 0.064***
(0.013)
0.031*
(0.014)
Connected2 0.081***
(0.020)
0.055*
(0.027)
Firm Size -0.091***
(0.020)
-0.086***
(0.015)
-0.0097***
(0.022)
-0.026***
(0.001)
-0.027***
(0.000)
-0.025***
(0.003)
Leverage -0.178***
(0.032)
-0.174***
(0.041)
-0.181***
(0.016)
-0.159*
(0.082)
-0.151*
(0.078)
-0.155*
(0.067)
Growth Opportunities 0.376***
(0.082)
0.370***
(0.061)
0.380***
(0.051)
0.314***
(0.021)
0.301***
(0.050)
0.299***
(0.062)
Large Shareholders 0.009
(0.016)
0.007
(0.014)
0.006
(0.017)
0.108
(0.422)
0.0102
(0.321)
0.100
(0.303)
Board Independence -0.001*
(0.000)
-0.000*
(0.000)
-0.001*
(0.000)
0.178
(0.415)
0.174
(0.369)
0.176
(0.510)
CEO Duality 0.084
(0.320)
0.080
(0.291)
-0.079
(0.401)
0.139
(0.282)
0.140
(0.203)
0.142
(0.325)
Inverse Mills ratio(λ) 0.086
(0.275)
0.091
(0.327)
0.103
(0.384)
0.014
(0.051)
0.020*
(0.010)
0.011
(0.007)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind_Food 0.092
(0.305)
0.098
(0.279)
0.087
(0.214)
0.061
(0.205)
0.058
(0.182)
0.064
(0.129)
Ind_Basic 0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
Ind_Const -0.274*
(0.138)
-0.270*
(0.141)
-0.258*
(0.135)
-0.281*
(0.140)
-0.273*
(0.132)
-0.251*
(0.128)
Ind_Textile -0.115
(0.389)
-0.122
(0.435)
-0.120
(0.492)
-0.139
(0.251)
-0.141
(0.275)
-0.140
(0.288)
Ind_Consumer 0.519
(1.021)
0.490
(0.910)
0.531
(0.818)
0.630
(1.105)
0.611
(1.002)
0.640
(1.230)
Ind_Transp 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001*
(0.000)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000*
(0.000)
Ind_Services 0.026***
(0.004)
0.024***
(0.005)
0.028***
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
N. 2328 2328 2328 2328 2328 2328
R-square 0.260 0.221 0.226 0.202 0.186 0.219
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Table 9: Robustness tests
This table presents the robustness tests results. The dependent variables in the models I to IV are
Leverage, Excess Cash and the Abnormal Accruals of the firm. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
***, **, And * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Panel A: Alternative definitions of financial policies variables
Variables (I) (II) (III)
Model I: Leverage
Connected 0.081**
(0.023)
Connected1 0.092**
(0.030)
Connected2 0.104**
(0.034)
R-square 0.309 0.253 0.270
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model II: Excess Cash
Connected 0.064*
(0.033)
Connected1 0.070**
(0.025)
Connected2 0.85***
(0.010)
R-square 0.186 0.217 0.243
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model III: Accruals Management
Connected 0.044***
(0.005)
Connected1 0.067***
(0.012)
Connected2 0.080***
(0.013)
R-square 0.236 0.205 0.187
N. 2328 2328 2328
Panel B: Inclusion of other measures of corporate governance
Model I: Leverage
Connected 0.080***
(0.021)
Connected1 0.095***
(0.029)
Connected2 0.101***
(0.010)
Foreign Listing × Connected -0.014*
(0.006)
Foreign Listing × Connected1 -0.035*
(0.016)
Foreign Listing × Connected2 -0.028*
(0.013)
Foreign Listing -0.005***
(0.001)
-0.002***
(0.000)
-0.008***
(0.002)
R-square 0.215 0.204 0.187
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model II: Excess Cash
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Connected 0.079***
(0.006)
Connected1 0.088***
(0.024)
Connected2 0.114***
(0.030)
Foreign Listing× Connected 0.125
(0.402)
Foreign Listing× Connected1 0.118
(0.258)
Foreign Listing× Connected2 0.132
(0.374)
Foreign Listing 0.052
(0.107)
0.045
(0.093)
0.047
(0.082)
R-square 0.274 0.221 0.236
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model III: Accruals Management
Connected 0.054***
(0.009)
Connected1 0.073**
(0.015)
Connected2 0.090***
(0.020)
Foreign Listing× Connected 0.005
(0.010)
Foreign Listing× Connected1 0.003
(0.020)
Foreign Listing× Connected2 0.000
(0.001)
Foreign Listing 0.012
(0.046)
0.010
(0.014)
0.018
(0.053)
R-square 0.313 0.261 0.274
N. 2328 2328 2328
Panel C: Alternative estimation techniques
Pooled regressions
Model I: Leverage
Connected 0.072***
(0.011)
Connected1 0.085***
(0.009)
Connected2 0.106***
(0.021)
R-square 0.281 0.299 0.257
N. 403 403 403
Model II: Excess Cash
Connected 0.056***
(0.008)
Connected1 0.062**
(0.024)
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Connected2 0.084***
(0.009)
R-square 0.168 0.189 0.204
N. 403 403 403
Model III: Accruals Management
Connected 0.065***
(0.012)
Connected1 0.081***
(0.019)
Connected2 0.096***
(0.014)
R-square 0.214 0.230 0.208
N. 403 403 403
Random effect regressions
Model I: Leverage
Connected 0.063***
(0.003)
Connected1 0.071**
(0.022)
Connected2 0.097**
(0.031)
R-square 0.310 0.239 0.195
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model II: Excess Cash
Connected 0.076***
(0.004)
Connected1 0.090***
(0.015)
Connected2 0.120***
(0.031)
R-square 0.205 0.191 0.212
N. 2328 2328 2328
Model III: Accruals Management
Connected 0.039***
(0.001)
Connected1 0.058**
(0.019)
Connected2 0.080**
(0.026)
R-square 0.232 0.196 0.225
N. 2,328 2,328 2,328
